Calidad de Gobierno en el diseño de política pública: el caso del Programa de Concurrencia con las Entidades Federativas en México
Quality of Government in public policy design: The case of the Concurrency Program with federal entities in Mexico
Abstract
Objective: To analyze the resources distribution on the Concurrency Program with the Federal Entities 2015-2017 to determine the possible discretional use of the public resources. Methodology: A semi-longitudinal study was made, which permitted to develop a stratification of production units, which were benefited by the Concurrency Program under three criteria: 1) the total amount of support (monetarily wise); 2) the yearly obtained income and 3) if it had made the investment without it. Results: It was obtained a classification of six production units by stages. For the production units that fall under the lower stages of income is almost impossible to obtain the support when competing against the big companies, given that the discretional modus operandi of resources placement favors the units of production with more significant income sources. Limitations: A third party developed the databases; leaving room for a field research to be done with the production units that were given the support. Conclusions: We can easily observe weaknesses on the selection of target population, when assigning the resources at a town-level, and the level of income of the companies, which can be translated as an area of opportunity on the way the resources of the program are assigned.Keywords:
regional development, quality of government, discretion, public policy, target population, stratification of beneficiaries.Abstract
Objective: To analyze the resources distribution on the Concurrency Program with the Federal Entities 2015-2017 to determine the possible discretional use of the public resources. Methodology: A semi-longitudinal study was made, which permitted to develop a stratification of production units, which were benefited by the Concurrency Program under three criteria: 1) the total amount of support (monetarily wise); 2) the yearly obtained income and 3) if it had made the investment without it. Results: It was obtained a classification of six production units by stages. For the production units that fall under the lower stages of income is almost impossible to obtain the support when competing against the big companies, given that the discretional modus operandi of resources placement favors the units of production with more significant income sources. Limitations: A third party developed the databases; leaving room for a field research to be done with the production units that were given the support. Conclusions: We can easily observe weaknesses on the selection of target population, when assigning the resources at a town-level, and the level of income of the companies, which can be translated as an area of opportunity on the way the resources of the program are assigned.Keywords:
regional development, quality of government, discretion, public policy, target population, stratification of beneficiaries.Downloads
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